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Perspective
by Steve Hanke
he new york times columnist and nobel laureate 
Paul Krugman (“Dr. Gloom”) and New York University 
professor Nouriel Roubini (“Dr. Doom”), who gained 
fame as one of the first to detect the U.S. housing bubble, 
have fingered tiny Latvia as the next domino to fall.  They argue that 
Latvia is in the same situation as Argentina was in late 2001.  And 
as a result, Latvia will be forced to devalue its currency and default 
on its debt, as did Argentina in early 2002.  Then, the argument GE
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goes, neighboring Estonia and Lithuania will be forced to follow 
suit and a damaging wave of devaluations and defaults will sweep 
through Central and Eastern Europe.  This will be followed by yet 
more international gloom and doom.  
Just what, if anything, does Latvia today have in common 
with Argentina in 2001?  On the surface, it appears that Latvia is 
employing the same type of exchange-rate system as did Argentina. 
Latvia’s currency trades in a narrow band of plus or minus 1% 
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quite low by international standards.  Argentina, in contrast, had 
persistent problems with cutting spending and had a much higher 
debt to GDP ratio.  
In the monetary sphere, there is a straightforward way to 
determine whether a monetary authority that links its currency 
to another is in danger of breaking the link: compare it to an 
“automatic” system.  The most automatic system is a currency 
board, which issues money convertible on demand into a foreign 
anchor currency at a fixed rate of exchange.  As reserves, a currency 
board holds foreign assets equal to 100% or slightly more of the 
monetary base (its note, coin, and deposit liabilities).
These characteristics ensure that the quantity of domestic 
currency in circulation is determined solely by market demand 
for domestic currency.  They imply that for a currency board, net 
foreign reserves (foreign assets minus foreign liabilities) should 
be close to 100% of the monetary base. Moreover, “reserve pass-
though” (the change in the monetary base divided by the change 
in net foreign reserves over the period in question) should also be 
close to 100%.
During the three years before Argentina’s currency crisis of 
December 2001-January 2002, Argentina’s monetary system, 
often mistakenly termed a currency board, was not operating 
in “automatic” fashion.  Its reserve pass-through was not even 
close to 100%, and after mid 2001, its net foreign reserves as a 
Table 1.  General government 
deficit (-) and surplus (+) (% of GDP)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Euro area -3.1 -2.9 -2.5 -1.2 -0.6 -1.9
Estonia 1.7 1.7 1.5 2.9 2.7 -3.0
Latvia -1.6 -1.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -4.0
Lithuania -1.3 -1.5 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 -3.2
Source: Eurostat      
Table 2.  General government  
consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Euro area 69.3 69.7 70.4 68.6 66.2 69.6
Estonia 5.6 5.0 4.5 4.3 3.5 4.8
Latvia 14.6 14.9 12.4 10.7 9.0 19.5
Lithuania 21.1 19.4 18.4 18.0 17.0 15.6
Source: Eurostat
around a peg of 0.7028 lats per euro.  In 2001, the Argentine peso 
was linked to the U.S. dollar at one to one.  But the similarities 
stop there. 
Latvia and its Baltic neighbors have been models of fiscal 
prudence (see Tables 1 and 2).  Before last year, when the recession 
began, all had low budget deficits or even budget surpluses.  They 
have shown willingness to make tough cuts in government 
spending.  They also have ratios of debt to GDP that remain 
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percentage of its monetary base fell well below 100% (see Chart 
1).  By comparison, Latvia’s monetary system—even though not 
legally a currency board system—is operating largely as though it 
were one.  In consequence, Latvia could convert its entire monetary 
base into euros at the current exchange rate.  The same can be said 
of Estonia and Lithuania—two countries that officially adopted 
modified currency board systems in 1992 and 1994, respectively.  
The data speak clearly.  Latvia and its Baltic neighbors are 
not repeats of Argentina.  Their economies have suffered greatly 
from a sudden stop of foreign investment and from recession in 
Western Europe, but they retain ample foreign reserves.  
They would do better to officially adopt the euro, even without 
the blessing of the European Central Bank, than to devalue their 
national currencies.  
Steve H. Hanke is a Professor of Applied Economics at The Johns 
Hopkins University in Baltimore and a Senior Fellow at the Cato 
Institute in Washington, D.C.
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Chart 1: Net Foreign Reserves and Reserve Pass-Through
(currency board orthodoxy = close to 100%)
